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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD R 
PATRICIA ] 
VS. 
DR. JAMES 
. BLACK, D. 
BLACK, 
D.S. 
Plaintiffs and 
S. BOYCE, 
Defendant and 
and ) 
Appellants, ) 
Respondent. ) 
Case No. 14358 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for damages brought by the buyers 
of corporate stock against the seller for an illegal sale of 
the stock which was the subject matter of the buyers1 condition-
al sales agreement contrary to the provisions in the Uniform 
Commercial Code. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the Court. From a verdict for 
the defendant of no cause of action the plaintiffs appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellants seek to have the judgment of the 
Trial Court reversed and a new trial granted to determine 
plaintiffs1 damages from the wrongful sale of the purchased 
stock. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In August, 1961, the plaintiffs and the defend-
ant , together with one, Doctor E. Wayne Allred, purchased 
a property fronting on State Street in Orem, Utah. The 
property had formerly been a motel and had an approximate 
size of three and one-half acres. (Tr. 4) After acquisi-
tion the owners of the property incorporated under the 
name of Orem Professional Plaza, Inc. and issued 90 
shares of stock, 30 shares to each of them. (Tr. 6 
lines 7-11) They then transferred all of the property to 
the corporation. (Tr. 14 lines 2-9) Each of the three 
owners established their professional offices in separate 
suites in the former motel property. In 1963 the defend-
ant moved his dental practice to the State of California 
(Tr. 6 lines 25-27) and in 1964 negotiated to sell pla' 
tiffs his 30 shares of stock in Orem Professional Plaza, 
Inc. (Tr. 6 lines 28-30) On June 4, 1964, the defendant 
forwarded a letter consummating the transaction (ex. 4) 
and a letter of resignation (Ex. 5) as officer and direct-
or of the corporation. (Tr. 7 lines 20-25) No formal 
agreement was prepared for the stock purchase, but the 
plaintiffs executed a promissory note for $3,343.20 (Ex. 
2) (Tr. 8 lines 4-9 and Tr. 8 lines 25-30) The defendant, 
seller of the stock, retained possession of the stock 
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certificates, the parties agreeing by their testimony that the 
stock was to be transferred upon completion of payment, (Tr. 
64 lines 3-7 and 23-30) The plaintiffs made irregular payments 
to the defendant on the promissory note through May 13, 1967. 
(Ex. 7) (Tr. 9 lines 3-7) In 1964 four payments were made, in 
1965 two payments, two in 1966, and in 1967 three, all of 
different and varying amounts. (Ex. 7) By February 28, 1967 
plaintiffs had made advance payments of $102.02, more than 
required by the terms of the promissory note. By May 13, 
1967, they were $45.46 paid in advance. By July 7, 1967, 
according to the terms of the promissory note they were $65.98 
in arrears. On July 7, 1967, the defendant claimed to have 
sent a letter to the Plaintiff, Richard R. Black, but not 
addressed to the Plaintiff, Patricia Black, the other purchaser 
(Ex. 8) (Tr. 17 lines 2630, Tr. 18 lines 19-29) The letter was 
never received by the plaintiffs. (Tr. 29 lines 16-21) There-
after, on December 6, 1967, the defendant received a letter 
from the plaintiffs (Ex. 6) together with a check for two 
installments in the sum of $111.76. (Tr. 9 lines 24-30, Tr. 
10 lines 2-7) The letter informed the defendant that the 
plaintiffs would pay two payments monthly and had sold other 
property by which they would soon be able to pay the balance 
owing upon the note. The defendant did not respond to the 
letter but banked the payments received with the letter. On 
August 7, 1967, prior to the receipt of the two installments 
-3-
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and the letter of December 6, 1967, the defendant sold 
the 30 shares of stock to the other stockholders of Orem > 
Professional Plaza for the then remaining unpaid balance 
upon the promissory note. (Tr. 13 lines 17-21) No 
further notice of any kind was given to the plaintiffs. 
No notification was given to the plaintiffs after the 
receipt of the two installments and the letter of December 
6, 196 7 which informed the plaintiffs of the prior sale 
of the stock to the other owners of the Orem Professional 
Plaza, Inc. (Tr. 67 lines 1-10) After the/ letter of 
December 6, 1967 from the plaintiffs to the defendant no 
further communication transferred between them. The 
reafter^ the other owners of Orem Professional Plaza 
made a demand for rentals and eventually evicted the 
plaintiffs from the Professional Offices. (Ex. 9) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT EXHIBIT 
NO. 8, A COPY OF A LETTER ADDRESSED TO ONE 
PLAINTIFF BUT NOT RECEIVED BY EITHER PLAINTIFF 
CONSTITUTED NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR PAYMENT 
The Court, over objections, admitted into 
evidence a carbon copy of a letter from the defendant to 
the Plaintiff, Richard R. Black, ostensibly mailed on the 
7th of July, 1967. (Ex. 8) According to the carbon 
copy, the letter was addressed to Plaintiff Richard R. 
-4-
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Black only, mailed to his place of business and not the residence 
of the plaintiffs' herein (Ex. 8) (Tr. 18 lines 19-24) and was 
not received by him. (Tr. 29 lines 16-21) The rules of evidence 
provide that a letter which is shown to have been properly 
stamped and correctly addressed and deposited in the mail is 
presumed by the courts to have been received by the addressee 
under due course of transmission by post. Jones on Evidence, 
Chapter 2, Section 60, page 103. However, as quoted in Jones 
on Evidence, the presumption is valid only when certain criteria 
has been met when, at page 105, it says: 
However, there is authority holding that the 
presumption does not arise where there is no 
actual proof that the letter was placed in the 
mail or that the customary practice was 
followed. 
The Utah Court dealt with this in the Utah case Brown v. 
The Fraternal Accident Association of America, 18 Utah 265, 
55 Pac 63 (1898) wherein the court said: 
Where notice is properly sent by mail, it 
raises at least a prima facie presumption, 
that the notice was received. This pre-
sumption is not conclusive. 
The Court in a later case dealt more specifically with the 
matter and the rebutting of the presumption in Campbell v. 
Gowans and Milner, 35 Utah 268, 100 Pac. 397 (1909) wherein 
the Court said: 
The mailing of a letter postpaid, and properly 
addressed to a person shown to reside in a city 
or town to which the letter was addressed, creates 
no legal presumption, but a presumption or in-
-5-
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ference of fact, that it reached its destination. 
• • • 
The testimony of the witness Milner is therefore 
some evidence that the letter testified to by 
him wvs received by the Gowanses in the due 
course of mail. The defendants, however, testi-
fied, that no such letter as testified to by 
Milner was received by them. On such question 
we think the evidence preponderates in favor 
of the defendants. . . . Id. at 284 [emphasis 
suppliedj 
Thus, the Utah Court has held that the presumption is 
overcome by the testimony of the recipient of the letter 
that the letter was not received. This has remained 
the rule of law and is the identical circumstance that 
is present in the case now before the Court. The defendant 
did not testify that he placed it in the mail, but that 
it was picked up by a mailman at his office. (Tr. 19 
lines 4-10) Plaintiff Richard Black testified that he 
never received nor knew of the existence of the letter. 
(Tr. 29 lines 16-21) On the ruling of this Court in 
Campbell v. Gowans, the requirement of proof of such 
notification was not met. There was no evidence that it 
was done in the usual course of mailing and, in addition, 
there was no evidence showing that it had been deposited 
in the mail. The evidence shows that the letter was 
addressed to one plaintiff only and was not sent to 
their place of residence. In the case Walker Bank and 
Trust Co. v. First Security Corporation, 9 Utah 2d 215, 
341 P.2d 944 (1959), this Court held that the presumption 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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does not occur when a letter, even though mailed in the regular 
course of business, was not received when it was not addressed 
to where the party was living. As cited in 29 Am Jur 2d 878 at 
page 981: 
A letter written to a party to a suit is not 
admissible in evidence against him if it was 
never received by him and has never been 
in his possession. (cases cited for this 
principle: Smith v. Shoemaker, 17 Wall (US) 
630, 21 L Ed 717; Pierce v,"TTerce, 97 Colo 
228, 48 P.2d 1024; Wilson v. Mitchell, 48 
Colo 454, 111 Pac 21; Purinton v. Purinton, 
101 Me 250, 63 A 925; Hedden v. Roberts, 
134 Mass 38; Phillips v. Scott, 43 Mo 86) 
In the Idaho case Matlock v. Citizen National Bank 
of Salmon, Idaho , 250 Pac 648, 50 ALR 1418 (1926) the 
Court said: 
When a letter, properly addressed and stamped, 
is deposited in the postoffice, the presumption 
arises that such letter arrived in due course 
at its destination. However, when the failure 
of such a letter to arrive has been established, 
there conversely arises the presumption that it 
was never mailed. 
29 Am Jur 2d 198 at page 251 provides: 
Some authority holds that the presumption is 
entirely overcome by the uncontradicted testi-
mony of the addressee that the letter was never 
received . . . 
and cites those courts adhering to such principle as Arkansas, 
Colorado and Utah, citing the case of Planters' Mutual Insurance 
Co. v. Green, 72 Ark 305, 80 SW 151; Conklin v. Shaw, 67 Colo 
169, 185 Pac. 661; Campbell v. Gowans, 35 Utah 268, 100 Pac 397. 
This writer believes that the law in Utah is well 
-7-
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is well established that for the admissibility of a 
letter as evidence of the notice and demand in a case 
the evidence must show that not only was the letter 
properly and in the regular course of business mailed, 
but that the same was received by the person by whom 
such letter or notice was to be given. Such is not the 
case in the matter now before the Court. Such letter 
was not received, not mailed in the usual course of 
business, not addressed to both obligors on the debt, 
the plaintiffs, and not mailed to their residence address. 
On such evidence, the Trial Court should have concluded that 
plaintiff did not receive a notice demanding the balance 
due on the acceleration of the note as provided by the 
option clause in the note. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT PLAINTIFFS 
BY NOT TENDERING THE BALANCE OF THE PURCHASE PRICE 
FOR THE SHARES OF STOCK LOST ALL RIGHTS IN THE 
SHARES 
The transaction entered into between the 
plaintiffs and defendant which gave rise to this action 
might be characterized as either an orally agreed condi-
tional sales contract for the purchase of 3 0 shares of 
stock in Orem Professional Plaza, or a sale by execution 
of a promissory note secured by a pledge of 30 shares 
of stock. (Tr. 8 lines 25-30, Tr. 64 lines 3-7). It is 
immaterial whether it is characterized as a conditional 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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sales contract of the stock or a sale of the stock coupled 
with a promissory note with pledge of stock as security, 
since the Uniform Commercial Code, as adopted in Utah, does 
not differentiate between conditional sales or reservation of 
title agreements, but catagorizes and treats all such agreements 
as secured transactions. Section 70A-9-107, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended, reads: 
A security interest is a 'purchase 
money security interest' to the extent 
that it is 
(a) taken or retained by the seller of 
the collateral to secure all or part 
of its price. . . . 
In this action, the requirements of the Statute of 
Frauds pertaining to this are met by the admissions of the 
parties (Tr. 64 lines 3-7) that this was a sal^ where title 
was to pass upon payment. The Court is cited to 70A-8-319, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, which provides as 
follows: 
A contract for the sale of securities is 
not enforceable by way of action or defense 
unless . . . 
(d) the party against whom enforcement 
is sought admits in his pleading, 
testimony or otherwise in court that 
a contract was made for sale of a 
stated quantity of described securities 
at a defined or stated price. 
Thus, we have here a sale of the shares of stock 
which are subject to the terms of the Uniform Commercial 
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Code (Tr. 8 lines 4-9) and that said security interest 
is perfected by the action of the defendant in this 
case retaining possession of the collateral. (Tr. 64 
lines 3-7) Section 70A-9-305, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended, provides: 
/ A security interest in . . . instruments, 
negotiable documents or chattel paper 
may be perfected by the secured party's 
taking possession of the collateral. . . . 
Both parties to this action are subject to the 
terms of the Uniform Commercial Code. The right of the 
secured party to dispose of collateral after default is 
given in Section 70A-9-504, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
as amended, which reads in part: 
(1) A secured party after default may sell, 
lease or otherwise dispose of any or all of the 
collateral in its then condition or following 
any commercially reasonable preparation or 
processing. . . . [emphasis supplied] 
(3) Disposition of the collateral may be by 
public or private proceedings and may be made 
by way of one or more contracts. Sale or other 
disposition may be as a unit or in parcels at any 
time and place and on any terms but every aspect 
of the disposition including the method, manner, 
time, place and terms must be commercially reason-
able. . . . reasonable notification of the 
time and place of any public sale or reasonable 
notification of the time after which any private 
sale or other intended disposition is to be made 
shall be sent by the secured party to the debtor 
. . . [Emphasis supplied] 
Section 70A-9-504 imposes upon the secured 
party the obligation to: 
-10-
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(a) Provide the debtor notification of the time 
after which any private sale or other intended disposition 
is to be made; and 
(b) That the sale or disposition of the security 
must be commercially reasonable as to the method, manner, 
time, place and terms. 
Thus, the Uniform Commercial Code places upon the 
secured party certain obligations to protect the rights of 
the debtor in the collateral even after default. Section 
70A-9-506, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, provides in 
part: 
At any time before the secured party has 
disposed of collateral or entered into 
a contract for its disposition under section 
70A-9-504 . . . the debtor . . . may . . . 
redeem the collateral by tendering fulfillment 
of all obligations secured by the collateral 
as well as the expenses reasonably incurred 
by the secured party . . . 
Such provision provides to the debtor the opportunity to redeem 
the collateral and requires that notice be received by the debtor so 
that he may have knowledge of his redemption rights, the intended 
disposition of the property, and his opportunity to exercise his 
right under such section. 
Section 70A-9-507, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 
provides that the secured party is liable to the debtor, even 
though the debtor is in default, if the disposition of the 
security does not comply with the criteria for disposition 
-11-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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imposed upon the secured party by :^-504 above cited. 
Section 7QA-9-507 defines in part: 
. . . If the disposition has occurred the 
debtor or any person entitled to notification 
. . . has a right to recover from the secured 
party any loss caused by a failure to comply 
with the provisions of this part. 
The sale of the security carried out without notification 
of the intended disposition is a violation of the above 
quoted Section 70A-9-504, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
asmended, and, further, the sale of the security for the then 
remaining unpaid balance is not commercially reasonable 
where the stock had been sold to the plaintiffs for a 
price of Three Thousand Three Hundred Forty-Three and 
20/100 Dollars ($3,343.20) three times the amount for 
which the security was sold to the subsequent purchaser 
from the defendant or One Thousand One Hundred Thirty-
Two and Ne/100 Dollars ($1,132.00) (Tr. 8 lines 4-9; 
Tr. 53 lines 25-30) Evidence was presented to the 
Court of the value of the property at the time of the 
purchase of the property (Ex. 1); of the appreciation 
and value of the property which were the only assets 
owned by the corporation (Tr. 6 lines 7-21); of the 
total outstanding stock being 90 shares (Tr. 6 lines 
10-12); and of the value at the time of the sale in 
August, 1967, (Tr. 27 line 19 to Tr. 20 line 4) and for 
which the plaintiffs brought action for damages for 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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violation of their rights as debtors under the Uniform Commercial 
Code. The ruling of the Trial Court did not afford the plaintiffs 
the rights given by the Uniform Commercial Code, and forfeited 
the Nineteen Hundred Thirty-Nine and 94/100 Dollars ($1,939.93) 
paid by plaintiffs on the purchase price. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY RULING THAT THE PLAINTIFFS 
BEING IN DEFAULT UNDER THE PROMISSORY NOTE HAD NO 
FURTHER RIGHTS TO ASSERT A CLAIM FOR DAMAGES OR 
TO COMPLAIN OF THE SALE OF THE STOCK TO THE SUB-
SEQUENT PURCHASERS. 
Fundamental to the law of contracts is well 
established law, prevalent both in Utah and in virtually 
all jurisdictions, that no cause of action on a contract 
can arise before the contract is broken and, that upon 
breach of contract, the party not in default has an 
election of remedies. As stated in 17 Am Jur 2d 445 at 
page 903: 
While no cause of action on a contract can arise 
before the contract is broken, and, as a general 
rule and in the absence of an anticipatory 
breach, no cause of action arises until the 
time for performance has expired, the law arms 
a party with a remedy for breach of contract 
by the other party, (citations cited therein) 
. . . 
As a general rule, upon the breach of a contract 
the injured party may, by election, rescind and 
recover the value of any performance by him, or 
he may stand by the contract and recover the 
damages for the breach. Where money is paid on 
a contract which is executory on the part of him 
who receives the money and he altogether fails 
-13-
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to fulfill his part of the contract, the injured 
party has an electon to either bring an action 
on the contract to recover damages for the non-
performance or to consider the contract as rescinded 
and recover back the money paid as had and 
received to his use, although he may not do both. 
In other words, h£ may resort to alternative 
remedies calculated to place him in status quo. 
. . . The view is taken that where one party 
refuses to perform, the other has an election to 
sue for damages or to treat the contract as 
rescinded and to make a new contract. lemphasis 
supplied] 
In the case before the Court, upon the claimed 
default of the plaintiffs on the purchase of the stock 
(the promissory note which is the document evidencing 
the purchase of the stock) the defendant had an election 
of remedies either to rescind the contract or to sue for 
damages for the nonperformance. The Court should note 
that at the time of the alleged default the plaintiffs 
had paid sixty percent (60%) ($1,939.94) of the purchase 
price on the promissory note. If the actions by the 
defendant in attempting to sell the security are to be 
viewed as a rescission of contract, then certain obliga-
tions are imposed by the law upon the defendant to make 
such rescission. As stated in 17 Am Jur 2d 512: 
The very idea of rescinding a contract 
implies that what has been parted with 
shall be restored on both sides, and hence 
the general rule, which is to be reasonably 
applied and . . . is that a party who wishes 
to rescind a contract must place the opposing 
party irTs'tatu quo. An attempted restoration of 
the status quo is an essential part of the 
-14-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
rescission of a contract, and in accordance 
with the general rule requiring restoration, 
fi Party cannot rescind and at the same time 
retain "the considerationf or a. part of the 
consideration, received under the contract. 
(numerous citations quoted thereunder) 
. . • [emphasis supplied] 
Where a party to a contract exercises the right 
under its terms to cancel it when it has been 
partially performed by the other party, he is 
required to place the other in statu quo--
that is, he must not cancel it so as to affect 
injuriously any rights that have already accrued 
to the other in its partial execution. 
The rule that he who desires to rescind a 
contract must restore whatever he has received 
under it is one of justice and equity, not of 
procedure—o£ substance, not of form—and must 
be reasonably construed and "applied. . . . 
The purpose of requiring a party rescinding a 
contract to restore to the other party every-
thing of value he has received under it is to 
make it unnecessary for the party to whom the 
restoration should be made to bring an action 
to obtain such restoration. (citations quoted 
thereunder) lemphasis supplied] 
That Utah adheres to such construction on rescission is born out 
by the case of Perry v. Woodall, 20 Utah 2d 399, 438 P.2d 813, 
where, at page 401, the court said: 
The law is well settled that one electing 
to rescind a contract must tender b-vck to 
the other contracting party whatever property 
of value he has received. 
Also, Wingets v. Bitters, 28 Utah 2d 231, 500 P.2d 1007, 
wherein the court said: 
In the strict legal or equitable sense, the 
term 'rescission1 imports the concept of 
completely annulling a contract as if it had 
never existed. This includes the idea of 
restoring the parties to their former status, 
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and the return by each to the other of what 
had been received under it, kaphasis 
supplied] 
In that case, the party attempting to assert 
rescission elected to retain possession of the corporate 
assets; in this case, the stock certificates and the 
funds received from the plaintiffs in payment on the 
contract. Therefore, defendant did not comply with the 
requirements of Utah Law regarding rescission. The 
other alternative for the alleged breach of contract 
would be a suit against the plaintiffs for damages for 
the breach of the promissory note for the unpaid balance 
of the note, together with expenses authorized by the 
promissory note. The actions by the defendant in this 
matter complied with neither rescission or damage suit 
but, instead, constituted a forfeiture of all rights of 
the plaintiffs herein both to the monies they had paid 
on the purchase agreement and to the stock, which was 
the subject matter of the purchase agreement. As stated 
in Winget v. Bitters, supra., wherein the court speaking 
of the rule of construction of law said that the contract 
should be construed most strictly against the party 
drawing the contract (in this case the promissory note) 
and "this is especially true as to a forfeiture, which 
is enforced only when the terms are clear and unequivocal." 
Id.at 235. Without a formalized agreement giving 
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authority for a forfeiture of the rights of the plaintiffs 
herein, the defendant, by unilateral action and without notice 
of acceleration or demand or suit for damages, sought to 
forfeit out all rights of the plaintiffs herein to the stock 
which had been more than half paid for and which was only in 
arrears $65.98, as of the time of the ostensible notice. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PLAINTIFFS 
WERE IN DEFAULT UNDER THE CONTRACT 
An examination of the promissory note, which was the 
purchase agreement for the stock (Ex. 2) shows that 
installments of $55.72 were to be paid commencing July 20, 
1964, and each month thereafter. The defendant testified to the 
payments shown on Exhibit No. 7. (Tr. 9 lines 3-7 and 20-23) 
and through May 13, 1967, the plaintiffs had paid $1,939.94. 
An examination of the payment record will show that as of 
January 25, 1967 the plaintiffs had paid $1,778.43. According 
to the payment schedule in the promissory note, by such date 
they should have paid $1,727.32, and were, thus, $51.11 paid 
in advance. By February 28, 1967 they were now paid $101.02 
in advance. By May 13, 1967 they were paid $45.46 in advance 
of the payments required under the note. As of July 7, 1967, 
the date on which the defendant ostensibly demanded the balance, 
they were only $65.98 in arrears of the payments provided in 
the note. The record of payments will show that between July 
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20, 1964 when the first payment was due and the date of 
July 7, 1967, the defendant had accepted payments on a 
very irregular basis, sometimes when the plaintiffs were 
in arrears and sometimes when the payments were paid in 
advance. The Court is cited to its very recent decision 
in Williamson v. Wanlass, Supreme Court No. 14076, decided 
January 30, 1976, wherein the Court cited 70A-1-208 on 
option to accelerate a promissory note, wherein the 
Court said that said section: 
[Sjeems to recognize that acceleration is 
a harsh remedy which should be allowed only 
if he has some reasonable justification for 
doing so, such as a good faith belief that 
the prospect of payment is impaired. 
and required that the debtor under such agreement be 
given reasonable notice that the note holder would elect 
to accelerate the payments and hold them accountable for 
strict performance in view of the past irregularities 
acquiesced in by the note holder. In the case at bar, 
the note gives to the holders of the note upon failure 
to pay the installments the right at their option to 
declare the entire balance due and payable. Pursuant to 
the Wanlass case that must be communicated to the debtors 
and a reasonable time given them to comply with it. In the 
case at bar, the notification was not ever communicated 
to the plaintiffs, having never received the July 7th 
letter. 
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Under these circumstances, the defendant never 
accelerated the payments, never exercised his option in the 
note to declare the balance due, and the conduct of the plaintiffs 
in their delay of the next payment until December 6, 1967 was 
no different than prior payments accepted by the defendant. 
That such harshness of remedy is not sanctioned by this Court 
as shown in the Supreme Court Decision in Fullmer v; Blood, 
Case No. 14082 decided February 18, 1976 where the Court cites 
with approval the general proposition that: 
[W]hen a seller accepts late payments which 
allow a buyer to believe the forfeiture pro-
vision will not be strictly enforced, the 
court will not enforce it unless notice is 
given and a reasonable time allowed to make 
up the delinquencies; and that where the 
forfeiture of the amount that has been paid 
in would be so inequitable as to be un-
conscionable the court of equity will refuse 
to enforce it. 
Another factor having bearing on this matter is 
the rule of construction on right to rescind or terminate 
being lost by ratification or waiver which is set forth in 17 
Am Jur 2d 489 wherein the right to rescind a contract or to 
terminate a contract may be lost when the breach has been 
waived by the injured party. At page 961 it states: 
The right to forfeit for a breach, given 
by a provision of the contract may be 
waived by the acceptance of benefits of 
the contract after the breach. 
The Transcript of the Record in this matter shows that on 
December 6, 1967, the plaintiffs herein sent a letter to the 
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defendant (Ex. 6) which letter was produced by Defendant 
Boyce. By his Answers to Interrogatoriesr defendant 
indicates he received two payments upon the promissory 
note with the letter and deposited them to his bank 
account. (Tr. 9 lines 24-30, Tr. 10 lines 1-7, Tr. 12 
lines 18-28) The testimony of the defendant is that the 
payments on said check were not honored at the bank. 
The testimony of the defendant is that there were 
specific monies left in the account to make payment of 
said checks and the checks were never returned. The 
testimony of the defendant that when he received the 
letter (Ex. 6) accompanied by the checks he did not 
notify plaintiffs that he had previously sold their 
stock and did not notify plaintiff that he was not 
accepting the payments nor that the delay in payment 
was not acceptable to him. Despite these facts, the 
defendant accepted the payments, banked them to his 
account, made no communication or notice to the plaintiffs 
that they were not acceptable and, nevertheless, forfeited 
the payments they had heretofore made upon the purchase 
agreement. His conduct is not in keeping with the standards 
required by this Court in the two recent cases of Williamson 
v. Wanlass, and Fullmer v."Blood, cited above and by Jones 
v. Thorvaldson, 15 Utah 2d 308, 392 P.2d 43, wherein the 
court said: 
_ on_ 
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We have no disagreement with plaintiffs' 
arguments to the effect that forfeitures 
are not favored in law; that language 
purporting to authorize forfeitures should 
be strictly construed; and that where there 
is a specification of a particular ground 
for forfeiture, it cannot be declared upon 
general or merely related defalcations. 
In the case at bar, there were no forfeiture provisions 
in the agreement, only an option to accelerate in the holder 
of the note. Such general provision cannot be the basis for a 
forfeiture. 
With the record of accepting payments not in strict 
conformity to the terms of the promissory note, plaintiffs 
were entitled to a notice requiring them to adhere in the 
future to strict performance and notification and demand of 
balance due, exercising the option to declare the entire balance 
due prior to rescission or suit for damages. To forfeit 
their interest in the stock without such notice and opportunity 
to respond is a violation of the plaintiffs• rights herein and 
is an error committed by the Trial Court. 
POINT V 
THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT IS CONTRARY TO 
THE INFERENCES TO BE DRAWN FROM THE EVIDENCE. 
Defendant contends that through the subsequent 
buyers of the stock the plaintiffs were given a right to 
redeem the stock for the then unpaid balance and that the 
same was communicated to the plaintiffs in October or November 
of 1967. (Tr. 52 lines 19-27) The validity of that evidence 
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must be measured in light of the circumstances that 
existed prior to the commencement of the lawsuit herein 
and prior to the dispute arising. The facts show that 
the Allreds occupied one of the suites in the same building 
in which the plaintiffs occupied a professional suite (Tr. 
5 lines 1-8); that the other buyers occupied a third 
suite in the building; and that they all were located in 
Orem, Utah. Mrs. Allred testified that in October or 
November, 1967, she notified Dr. Black of his right to 
redeem. (Tr. 47 lines 17-25) In December, 1967 (ostensibly 
after the communication of Mrs. Allred to Dr. Black that 
she had the stock and he could redeem it) Dr. Black sent 
the letter (Ex. 6) together with two installments to Dr. 
Boyce in California/ because he had received a notice of 
eviction in November 30, 1967 (Ex. 9) from the corporci-
tion to evict him from the property. (Tr. 25 lines 
18-21) It is inconceivable that had it been communicated 
in October or November, 1967, that the stock was there 
in adjoining offices on the same premises and available 
for his redemption that in December of 1967 the plaintiff 
would have mailed the two payments to California with 
the letter assuring Dr. Boyce that the balance would be 
forthcoming. Dr. Boyce banked the two installments 
without any communication back to Dr. Black that the 
stock had been previously sold to the Allreds and the 
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LaGeorge Music Company, The payment was not forwarded by Dr. 
Boyce to the buyers who ostensibly were to allow the redemption 
of the shares of stock by Dr. Black. The actions of Dr. Boyce 
in receiving and banking the payments, in not sending notice 
to Dr. Black or of communicating to him that the stock had 
been previously sold after he received the two payments on 
December 6, 1967, compels us to the conclusion that no such 
communication of redemption rights was made by Mrs. Allred to 
Dr. Black. Particularly is this important to evaluate in 
light of the fact that the property was increasing in value 
during that period of time very rapidly because of the rapid 
growth in Orem City, and the LaGeorge Music Company people and 
the Allreds stood to profit by securing of the Black stock by 
payment only of the unpaid balance without regard to its true 
value or the original purchase price paid by the plaintiffs 
herein. The Trial Court erred in its ruling in this matter by 
presupposing in the memorandum decision that because tender 
had not been made by the Blacks for the balance of the purchase 
price that they had no further rights in the stock or the sale 
to others. 
CONCLUSION 
On the evidence presented to Court and on the record 
as it now stands, there can be no doubt but that on July 7, 
1967 the plaintiffs were in arrears in accordance with the 
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terms of the promissory note for the purchase of the 
30 shares of stock in the amount of $65.98. Although 
they were in arrears, the pattern of payment and accept-
ance of payments by the defendant over the period from 
July, 1964 through July, 1967 had been a waiver of the 
strict requirements of monthly installments set forth 
in the installment note. There can be no doubt that had 
proper notice been given to the plaintiffs, the defendant 
could have elected to rescind the contract by returning 
the $1,939.94 previously paid by plaintiffs upon the pur-
chase agreement and retained or sold the stock as he saw 
fit. There can further be no doubt that defendant could 
have made an election to bring a claim and suit for damages 
for the unpaid balance, together with court costs and attorneys1 
fees as provided in the note. The defendant did not have 
the right to forfeit plaintiffs1 payments and sell the stock. 
Pursuant to the terms of the Uniform Commercial Code, the 
plaintiffs were entitled to notice and to a sale which was 
commercially reasonable. In view of the fact that the stock 
certificates had been sold to the plaintiffs in 1964 for 
$3,343.00 and the testimony in Court that the property in 
1967 was worth approximately $100,000.00, the sale of the 
plaintiffs1 stock for $1,13 2.00 was not commercially reason-
able. The plaintiffs were not afforded the right to redeem 
the stock nor afforded the notice of the intended sale. The 
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Trial Court improperly included evidence of the ostensible 
notice of acceleration and demand for payment despite the 
testimony that the same was never received. Based upon the 
authorities cited and the record, plaintiffs respectfully 
assert that they are entitled to a reversal and a new trial 
to determine the damages that they have suffered by reason 
of the wrongful sale of stock by the defendant. 
Respectfully submitted, 
1fy. ^T^jfO^ 
M. Dayle Jeffs^of Je|»^pd Jeffs 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs "and 
Appellants 
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